Posts Tagged ‘packaging’

Prepaid ain’t nothing but a payment method

Thursday, June 18th, 2009

In the US wireless marketplace, carriers covet postpaid customers above all, as do their investors. Carriers have focused their businesses on a subscription model comprising subsidized handsets, locked phones and multi-year contracts. They use this approach to limit churn, keep ARPU high, and… well, because they’ve always done it.

Prepaid started in the US as a way to serve credit-challenged customers. A postpaid subscriber needs to have good credit, so the carrier has some assurance that he will pay through the contract term. Many prospects didn’t qualify, so the carriers turned to prepaid as a way to provide service without the risk of default.

And so it is today, fifteen years after the first prepaid customers were brought on line in the US. Carriers consider prepaid a marginal service with an unappealing financial profile targeted at an unimportant niche of customers.

In Europe it’s not this way. And several US MVNOs–Tracfone, Virgin and Boost in particular, have developed prepaid businesses that are more broadly targeted. There’s much more that can be done to mainstream prepaid in the US–if we look at prepaid differently.

Prepaid doesn’t mean you aren’t connected to your customers.
It does mean that you are not connected to customers by default, in the way a postpaid provider is by providing a monthly bill (and, of course, the chains of that 2-year contract). Prepaid customers don’t have to share anything with you–they can buy their phones and recharge cards at the retailer and remain anonymous–but with the right kind of programs and incentives, you can have as robust a customer relationship. Perhaps a better one, since it’s based on the quality of the product and the customer’s choice rather than contracts and penalties.

Prepaid is a more transparent product.
There is little or no subsidy with a prepaid phone, so the costs are more transparent to the subscriber. While prepaid providers, perhaps in imitation of their postpaid competitors, have gotten too creative and confusing with rate plans (per minute, daily fee plus per minute, minutes that expire, etc.), the base service concept–pay for what you use–is highly transparent and in tune with the way people consume lots of products these days.

Prepaid lacks many of the unpleasant aspects of postpaid. The simpler structure of prepaid, especially its lack of contracts and penalties, is a virtue today more than ever. (The Kindle pricing model is a prepaid subscription. Another widespread product, Skype, works on a prepaid model as well.)

Challenging the assumption that postpaid is better is important now because we are on the cusp of a revolution in wireless, always-on connected gadgets. Portable modems, GPS devices, and the aforementioned Kindle are but a sample of what we’ll see in the next few years. I, for one, hope the customer models for these devices show some of the innovation the devices themselves offer.

(Photo: one of those cool new mobile devices, the Novatel MiFi personal hot spot)

Related post:
Examining Kindle pricing

From “Think Again,” a book about decisionmaking gone wrong – Marc’s mistake story

Monday, February 16th, 2009


Think Again” is a great new business book in which authors Sydney Finkelstein of Dartmouth University and Jo Whitehead and Andrew Campbell of Ashbridge Business School describe research in cognitive science and behavioral economics to explain how the decisionmaking process goes awry and, even more importantly, how our minds obscure the mistakes we make and keep us from understanding the weaknesses in our decision processes. [The authors also have a website for the book, including pointers to some of the underlying research and other goodies.]

The book is full of great storytelling, and this one in particular, about an executive named Marc, seemed very appropriate for the Mistake Bank:

Marc was the managing director of the French subsidiary of an international manufacturer of packaging machinery. He was considering whether or not to acquire a company that had a near-monopoly on manufacturing a specialized type of food packaging machine. While the company had a strong position in the market, there were several warning signs that it was a risky investment. The business was highly dependent on sales to one large meat processing company. Because the machinery was a form of capital investment, sales tended to be highly cyclical. The management team had recently lost some of its more talented designers and marketers, and performance was flagging. The current owners of the business were keen to sell.

These risks were particularly an issue because Marc had committed to his head office that he would deliver relatively stable performance. The previous year, Marc had personally persuaded the head office to provide additional investment to his subsidiary for low-risk acquisitions, and so his reputation was at stake.

As the transaction progressed, some members of Marc’s supervisory board voiced their concerns about the proposed acquisition. Despte this, Marc went ahead. A few months later, following the discovery of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), or mad cow disease, in French cattle, the meat-processing customer announced that it was putting discretionary capital expenditure, including the packaging machines manufactured by Marc’s company, on hold. The management team was unable to deal with the dramatic drop-off in demand. Profits plunged into the red. Marc’s superiors were shocked, and Marc’s career received a large black mark.

Marc described why he thought he had made a flawed decision. “I was under pressure to do this deal for my own interest. If I went ahead, then the costs incurred in auditing and due diligence of the company would be capitalized and added to the cost of the investment. If I backed out, then they would all be charged to my office as an expense. Because we had been pursuing this company for a while, those costs were quite significant–and I guess I was influenced by that. I had an annual target to hit–and the charge-off would occur at the end of the financial year, leaving me no time to find a way to avoid a big loss. Of course, in the end, doing a bad deal was much worse for my position. I guess self-interest clouded my judgment.”

Reprinted with permission from Harvard Business Press. Copyright 2008 Sydney Finkelstein, Jo Whitehead, and Andrew Campbell. All Rights Reserved.