Posts Tagged ‘pricing’

Customers are talking: AT&T/Apple/Google – battle of the giants has begun

Thursday, August 6th, 2009

The dustup over Apple’s disabling of the Google Voice app on the iPhone is getting interesting. According to David Pogue, Google is rewriting the Google Voice application so that it will run as an ordinary web page–but be accessed just like the iPhone’s approved apps.

Why does AT&T care? Because Google Voice (like many other, much smaller applications) attacks the carriers’ most vulnerable pockets of profit. Text messaging costs virtually nothing to provide but yields the carriers 25 cents per message or $5 and up for a bundle of texts. International calling is infrequently used but, at 25 cents/minute and up, commands direct margins of somewhere around 92% (by comparison, Skype international calls to landlines average around 2 to 4 cents per minute).

So, at one level this is a technical or commercial dispute between corporate giants. At another, though, it’s a front-line battle for customer transparency. If AT&T, Verizon, etc., by dint of competitive threats, are required to reprice these fat-margined services, they’ll have to forgo profits, or redistribute the costs to other services–ones which are more central to their offering and which can be more easily shopped by customers.

Perhaps then we’ll get a bit closer to wireless service packaging that’s friendly, or at least less forbidding, to the customers paying the bill.

Related post:
David Pogue’s “Take Back the Beep”

Customers are talking: David Pogue’s “Take Back the Beep”

Tuesday, August 4th, 2009

There have been expressions of customer outrage in the past, but this one feels different. David Pogue, the widely read tech columnist of The New York Times, wrote a couple of weeks ago about the instructions wireless companies force you to listen to when you leave a voice mail for a cell customer, or retrieve them from your wireless phone.

Pogue asserted that the lengthy instructions were intended to boost usage and thereby carrier ARPU. He followed the initial column with a series of posts (begin here) on a campaign he titled “Take Back the Beep,” in which he asked readers to contact their cellphone carriers to complain about this practice.

The campaign was referenced by bloggers Doc Searls and Umair Haque (creator of the Edge Economy blog and possessing a, say, radical view of the vices and virtues of corporate America).

What’s different this time? Pogue, Haque and Searls enjoy a large, influential audience via the blogosphere and Twitter. This gives them real-time weapons they can deploy without going through editors’ approval. And their voices support each other, and inspire other writers (um, like this one) to further spread the word.

How different this is to one enraged customer browbeating a poor customer service rep! Perhaps this is the first strike in the battle against companies customers hate.

Related posts:
Companies profiting from customers’ mistakes, watch out
Doc Searls runs up against Simply Everything’s limits

Prepaid ain’t nothing but a payment method

Thursday, June 18th, 2009

In the US wireless marketplace, carriers covet postpaid customers above all, as do their investors. Carriers have focused their businesses on a subscription model comprising subsidized handsets, locked phones and multi-year contracts. They use this approach to limit churn, keep ARPU high, and… well, because they’ve always done it.

Prepaid started in the US as a way to serve credit-challenged customers. A postpaid subscriber needs to have good credit, so the carrier has some assurance that he will pay through the contract term. Many prospects didn’t qualify, so the carriers turned to prepaid as a way to provide service without the risk of default.

And so it is today, fifteen years after the first prepaid customers were brought on line in the US. Carriers consider prepaid a marginal service with an unappealing financial profile targeted at an unimportant niche of customers.

In Europe it’s not this way. And several US MVNOs–Tracfone, Virgin and Boost in particular, have developed prepaid businesses that are more broadly targeted. There’s much more that can be done to mainstream prepaid in the US–if we look at prepaid differently.

Prepaid doesn’t mean you aren’t connected to your customers.
It does mean that you are not connected to customers by default, in the way a postpaid provider is by providing a monthly bill (and, of course, the chains of that 2-year contract). Prepaid customers don’t have to share anything with you–they can buy their phones and recharge cards at the retailer and remain anonymous–but with the right kind of programs and incentives, you can have as robust a customer relationship. Perhaps a better one, since it’s based on the quality of the product and the customer’s choice rather than contracts and penalties.

Prepaid is a more transparent product.
There is little or no subsidy with a prepaid phone, so the costs are more transparent to the subscriber. While prepaid providers, perhaps in imitation of their postpaid competitors, have gotten too creative and confusing with rate plans (per minute, daily fee plus per minute, minutes that expire, etc.), the base service concept–pay for what you use–is highly transparent and in tune with the way people consume lots of products these days.

Prepaid lacks many of the unpleasant aspects of postpaid. The simpler structure of prepaid, especially its lack of contracts and penalties, is a virtue today more than ever. (The Kindle pricing model is a prepaid subscription. Another widespread product, Skype, works on a prepaid model as well.)

Challenging the assumption that postpaid is better is important now because we are on the cusp of a revolution in wireless, always-on connected gadgets. Portable modems, GPS devices, and the aforementioned Kindle are but a sample of what we’ll see in the next few years. I, for one, hope the customer models for these devices show some of the innovation the devices themselves offer.

(Photo: one of those cool new mobile devices, the Novatel MiFi personal hot spot)

Related post:
Examining Kindle pricing

Re-examining Kindle pricing

Monday, June 15th, 2009

UPDATE 13 July 2009: Kindle 2 price has been reduced to $299

The Kindle 2 ($359) is expensive. The Apple 3G (now reduced! $99!) is cheap. Right?

Lots of people have been criticizing Amazon for the high price tag they put on the Kindle, a nice and important device but no iPhone–including yours truly.

But the iPhone price decrease caused me to look again at the pricing model of the two devices and belatedly recognize that behind both prices are two different structures that influence both the upfront price and, perhaps most importantly, the total cost of ownership. Let’s break apart the pricing, then.

Kindle: $359 (no contract), wireless service (free), content ($9.99 per book).
iPhone: $99 (2-yr contract), wireless service (min $70/month), content ($0-$20 per app).

Let’s assume that content pricing cancels out–both seem like pretty good deals to me. Let’s also assume, to be fair, that the iPhone customer is replacing another cellphone, and that she would be paying $45 per month for voice access. This leaves the iPhone-only service charge as $25 per month.

Now the 2-year comparison price looks like this:

Kindle: $359
iPhone: $699

This isn’t meant to compare the value of the two devices. The iPhone can do a lot more than the Kindle, whereas the Kindle is a bit of a savant–really good at doing one thing. It’s meant to illustrate two different pricing models at work.

The iPhone is packaged using the traditional US wireless approach. Heavily subsidized initial cost, long-term contract (with penalties for early termination), monthly postpaid subscription services.

Kindle has simpler packaging. For the high upfront cost, you get the device free and clear, as well as the wireless service underlying the book ordering/fulfillment service. (One analyst estimates Amazon’s monthly wireless service cost at $2 per month per subscriber, by analyzing Sprint’s financial reports.) You pay more only when you buy something. Of course, the Kindle is not an open device (neither is the iPhone), so you can’t shop for better-value books elsewhere.

The Kindle isn’t necessarily expensive; it’s just packaged with one price for device and prepaid service. The iPhone, on the other hand, is a bit like leasing a car: low upfront and monthly payments that continue as long as you want to use the device. Both models are legitimate: but do point up the difficulty of understanding “price” in the connected technology marketplace.

Caveat emptor.

UPDATE 16 June: Jeff Bezos of Amazon discusses the Kindle pricing model, via NY Times Bits Blog.

Related post:
Kindle illuminates skim-pricing strategy

Kindle helps illuminate the skim-pricing strategy in tech

Thursday, May 7th, 2009

There are two main pricing strategies for consumer products. The first, called skim pricing, consists of pricing a product very high, limiting the market for that product to only those who really, really want it. The other, called penetration pricing, involves setting a low price (frequently below initial variable costs) to quickly grow volume and share and proceed down the experience curve.

For internet products and services, penetration pricing has been the norm. In fact, the most frequently-used pricing for internet products and services has been a particular variant of the penetration-pricing approach: free.

Skim pricing has traditionally been used for luxury goods, like clothes, cars, boats, etc. The high price of these items confers exclusivity and cachet to those who buy them. There was a tradition of skim pricing in earlier-generation tech products (remember $10,000 plasma televisions? Did you buy one? I didn’t think so.) Once the manufacturing costs for those products dropped, so did the pricing.

A related strategy is to foster adoption of new products by subsidizing them through a related service. Mobile phones in the US have been sold this way for a generation.

Amazon has chosen a skim pricing strategy for the Kindle, and it doesn’t appear that they are planning to lower it anytime in the forseeable future. The Kindle 2 costs $349 (no discounts) and the Kindle DX (announced yesterday) is a whopping $499.

Some of the press coverage yesterday focused on the possible payback for the DX through buying lower-priced books. But this isn’t Amazon’s strategy at all. Instead, they are targeting a small segment–heavy readers–who are price insensitive, and who are likely to buy lots of e-books to fill their Kindles. For them, price is no object if they can carry 50 books in their purse. (This excellent post from the New York Times’ Saul Hansell discusses Amazon’s focus on hard-core readers.)

So, Amazon has returned to a tried and true marketing strategy: create a product that serves a need of a small, price-insensitive segment, and price it to capture much of the value created. They are saying this–the Kindle is not for everyone–and profiting by it.

Related:

(Photo: the Kindle DX, available at your local Amazon retailer)

A Business Owner’s Novel Response to the Financial Crisis

Wednesday, February 4th, 2009

A local entrepreneur who’s in the physical therapy/rehabilitation business told me about his approach to dealing with the financial crisis:

First, he gave up his lease on a large office and moved into a smaller one, cutting his overhead substantially. That’s a tactic that would be at the top of anyone’s list.

Then, he did something unexpected… he raised his prices. As a result, he lost some clients. But because of the lower overhead, and the higher contribution margin of the remaining customers, he’s making more money.

As he said, “Basically, people who weren’t valuing the service don’t come anymore. The clients who are left really care about their health and are willing to invest in it. For them, the price is reasonable.”

Anyone can cut costs. But cutting costs and raising prices? That’s an innovative prescription.

Related post:
If you can raise prices, don’t hesitate